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WHY HEALTH LAWYERS MUST
BE PUBLIC-LAW LAWYERS:
HEALTH LAW IN THE AGE OF
THE MODERN REGULATORY
STATE
ABBE R. GLUCK*
It is my deep privilege to deliver these remarks here at the University
of Maryland, not only because the Law School has such a premier healthlaw faculty but, also, because it was in Maryland where I held my first three
jobs. One of those former employers, the great Senator from Maryland,
Paul S. Sarbanes, introduced me to Congress and inspired me to devote my
career to the subjects of legislation, the political process and the law. And
that is very much the topic of my remarks tonight, with health law as the
context.
Health law is not often framed as part of the “public-law” landscape,
and my goal is to explain why it should be. My aim is to convince the next
generation of health lawyers, policymakers, and health-law scholars that
they must see health law as a field that is intimately related to Congress,
federal statutes, federal agencies, and federalism, in order to have an impact
on it. I will then apply this public-law framework to some current events
involving the 2010 health reform statute—the Affordable Care Act
(“ACA”)1—to illustrate how shaping health law today requires an
understanding of the central roles now played in the field by the
quintessential players in the public-law domain: Congress, federal agencies,
the states, and the federal courts.

Copyright © 2015 by Abbe Gluck.
* Professor of Law, Yale Law School. Many thanks to Diane Hoffmann for inviting me, to
Senator Sarbanes for his continuing support and inspiration, and to Journal of Health Care Law
and Policy editor-in-chief Lindsey Imus. These are edited remarks from the Stuart Rome Lecture,
delivered at the University of Maryland School of Law on November 20, 2014.
1. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
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FROM PRIVATE LAW TO PUBLIC LAW

Why the need for this new framework? Health law has historically
come from the states, local governments, and the medical profession itself.
It was state courts and state law that decided most health-law matters, and it
was the medical profession (through self-regulation) that largely controlled
the physicians. So understood, health law was what law professors call a
field of “private law”—a field of law made from the ground up, and which
focused on regulating relationships among private parties. In the academy,
health law is often still analyzed and taught this way—around the language
of private actors or markets, or in terms of the special relationships that
permeate the field.
It is very hard to look around today and think that this private, local,
non-federal narrative still accurately describes the health care landscape. Of
course, it is the case that states and the profession still have certain,
localized areas of dominance (medical malpractice and licensing of
practitioners being two important examples) but, as a general matter, health
law has become a field of public law—by which I mean a field that is
defined by the role of the government. The ACA is, of course, the
culmination of this shift, but it is a transformation that has been underway
at least since the enactment of Medicare and Medicaid, which celebrate
their joint 50th anniversary this year.
Why does this matter? It matters because understanding the kind of
law that health law has evolved into tells us something about the field’s
modern mission—because the goals and interests of public law are different
than private law. It also tells us who the key players now are and how and
why policy change happens. Perhaps most importantly for lawyers, the
source of health law is now different. Today, health law is made not
through state or local law, but through the quintessential public law tool:
big, complex, federal statutes passed by Congress and then implemented by
federal agencies and courts, sometimes along with other actors, such as the
states. Health law today is national and statutory.
This understanding should change at least some of the focus of health
lawyers, scholars, and policy experts. For example, one rarely sees healthlaw literature about Congress, or about how Congress’s own pathologies
that are completely unrelated to health law (such as its budget rules and
gridlock problems) have a huge impact on the health policy that it
generates.2 Nor has there been deep study of health administrative law,3 and
2. Timothy Westmoreland is a rare exception and has called attention to this issue. See Abbe
R. Gluck, Symposium Issue Introduction: The Law of Medicare and Medicaid at Fifty, 15 YALE J.
HEALTH POL’Y, L. & ETHICS 1 (discussing recent Westmoreland lecture on these topics).
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so we cannot readily answer important questions like the following: In
which areas of health-law are federal agencies particular movers and
shakers? In what areas do federal agencies have overlapping jurisdiction? In
which areas do they have no jurisdiction at all? We also do not have a
modern account of the very significant state-federal relationships that have
been created under this new nationalized and statute-ized health-law
umbrella.
Moreover, once we understand health law as federal public law, we
also must think more about whether it makes a difference (and if so, what
kind of difference) to now have the federal courts in the game. Congress’s
creation of a federal statutory landscape of health care creates a whole new
role for the federal judiciary.4 Here, it is important to understand that the
federal judiciary (similar to Congress) carries with it a lot of its own
baggage that is completely separate from health law, but that will still have
a huge effect on it. The current challenge to the ACA in the Supreme Court,
as I will detail, is precisely such a case. It is case that is about the ACA, of
course, but it is also about an ongoing feud within the federal courts about
how federal statutory language should be interpreted, regardless of what the
subject matter is.
This jurisprudential transformation of health law is obviously a big
project, and one that I cannot fully address in a short lecture. Instead, my
goal is to provide a framework to introduce these questions, and to begin to
make the case about where health lawyers and law students should be
directing their focus.
II.

CONGRESS

Let’s start with Congress. Every transformative statute has its own
special story, and that includes the particulars of the path that the statute
took through Congress. The ACA’s story is very unique, and courts need to
understand it before they can enforce it.5
The ACA is going to go down in history as a textbook example of
what I am going to call “unorthodox lawmaking”—a term coined by
3. For two important exceptions to this lack of research, see Eleanor D. Kinney,
Administrative Law Protections in Coverage Expansions for Consumers under Health Reform, 7
J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 33, 34, 55, 60 (2011), and Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Health Law and
Administrative Law: A Marriage Most Convenient, 49 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1, 4, 5, 33 (2004).
4. See Abbe R. Gluck, The Federal Statutory Law of Health Law: The Law of “Statutes in a
Field” in the Statutory Era (unpublished manuscript on file with author).
5. For more discussion of how relevant the unique legislative-process story of any one
statute is to judicial interpretation, see Abbe R. Gluck et al., Unorthodox Lawmaking, Unorthodox
Rulemaking, 115 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015).
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political scientist Barbara Sinclair to connote the end of the “Schoolhouse
Rock” legislative process.6 I have written a lot about why unorthodox
lawmaking is important for legal doctrine.7 One important reason is that the
Supreme Court’s own doctrines of statutory interpretation are based on that
now defunct Schoolhouse Rock model: the assumption that statutes go
through a linear process, are internally coherent, and are meticulously and
consistently drafted.8
The ACA is the first major statute that is the combined product of five
congressional committees’ work: three in the House and two in the Senate.9
One result of this is that multiple drafts were produced and eventually
merged.10 Another result is that the overlapping jurisdictions of the
committees led to a great number of intersecting delegations to various
federal agencies under the oversight of different congressional committees.
This legislative story also gives us a framework through which to
understand the state-federal relationships that the ACA creates. Throughout
the drafting process, the two chambers were divided over the ACA’s
federalism structure; in particular, they disagreed about whether the Act’s
new health insurance marketplaces (called “exchanges”) should be run by
the federal government or by the states.11 As is common, the Senate
preferred a more state-oriented approach, offering the states the right of first
refusal to run their own exchanges, and the House took a more nationalist
approach, preferring a single federal exchange rather than state-run
versions.
The Senate’s state-deferential bill passed the full Senate by 60–39 in
2009.12 The House, however, was vigorously opposed to this bill;13 the plan
6. See BARBARA SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX
THE U.S. CONGRESS 8–9, 31 (3d ed. 2007).

LAWMAKING: NEW LEGISLATIVE PROCESSES IN

7. See generally Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the
Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part 1, 65
STAN. L. REV. 901, 979 (2013) (highlighting the prevalence of laws developing outside of the
traditional committee process); Gluck et al., supra note 5.
8. Gluck & Bressman, supra note 7.
9. See John Cannan, A Legislative History of the Affordable Care Act: How Legislative
Procedure Shapes Legislative History, 105 LAW LIBR. J. 131, 138 (2013) (stating that the ACA,
prior to passage, was referred to the Education and Labor, Energy and Commerce, Ways and
Means, Oversight, and Government Reforms Committees).
10. See id. at 140 (stating that the three versions of House Bill 3200 were merged into House
Bill 3962, the Affordable Health Care for America Act).
11. See Abbe R. Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism and Statutory Interpretation: State
Implementation of Federal Law in Health Reform and Beyond, 121 YALE L.J. 534, 578 (2011).
12. H.R. 3590, 111th Cong. (2009) (enacted); see generally U.S. Senate Roll Call Votes 111th
Congress
–
1st
Session,
U.S.
SENATE
(Dec.
24,
2009,
7:05
AM),
http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?&congress=111&ses
sion=1&vote=00396 (listing the Senate votes on H.R. 3590).
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was going to be for the House and the Senate to duke this out, and the
Senate would then presumably change its bill to reflect whatever
compromise emerged. But then something happened: Massachusetts
Democratic Senator Ted Kennedy died, and Republican Scott Brown
replaced him. This was the game changer, because the Senate now had only
59 ACA-friendly votes—not 60. If you learned in school that the Senate is a
majoritarian body, and that 51 is the magic number, you learned wrong. The
critical number in the Senate is 60, because 60 votes is what is required to
stop a filibuster, close debate, and move to a vote.
As a result, the Senate bill could not change because any amendment
to a bill, like any law itself, requires 60 votes to go anywhere in the U.S.
Senate. The consequence of all of this is that the initial draft bill that was
passed, which was intended to be just a starting offer, had to be the final
bill.14 It was never subject to the two-chamber negotiation, and it was never
cleaned up for ambiguities or redundancies in drafting (as most statutes are
and as all had originally assumed the ACA would be) because it never went
through the Conference Committee stage.15 Conference is the “clean up”
stage, but occurs only where the House and the Senate are reconciling
differences across two different bills. Here, the House bill never saw the
light of day because of the ripple effect of Senator Kennedy’s death on the
Democrats’ voting block. In the end, it should be clear that Nancy Pelosi is
really an unsung hero of health reform. As Speaker, she twisted the arms
she needed to twist and got the House to accept, essentially wholesale, a
state-exchange oriented bill that the House had vowed never to accept.
One final important, procedural side note: there was a so-called
“reconciliation bill”—a special budget measure that was deployed because
the budget process has special rules that do not allow filibusters; as a result,
the key number for reconciliation is 50, not 60, votes. The reconciliation
bill was passed alongside the ACA to give the House a few items that it
wanted. But reconciliation is no substitute for Conference. Bills generally
do not get cleaned up in reconciliation, and reconciliation is limited only to
budget-related changes, so most of the ACA could not be altered through
that process. The changes that were adopted as part of that measure (called
the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act) were consolidated into

13. H.R. 3590, 111th Cong. (2009); see also H.R. 3590 (111th): Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act, GOVTRACK.US (Oct. 8, 2009), https://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/1112009/h768.
14. Gluck, supra note 11.
15. Gluck & Bressman, supra note 7.
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the version of the ACA that appears in the statute books, so you have to
read the notes to know which sections were added through that process.16
So why do I tell you all of this history? The history is important
because the ACA is a statute and because it has already survived the
constitutional challenge to its existence—the 2012 case, National
Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius17—which means that the
rest of the ACA cases are going to be statutory interpretation cases. Hobby
Lobby from last term, which was about the ACA’s contraception-mandate
case, is one example.18 King v. Burwell, pending when this lecture went to
press, is another.19 The ACA’s procedural history is critical to these kinds
of cases because courts interpreting statutes make a lot of assumptions
about how statutes are drafted—assumptions that tend to track the
“textbook” model of the textbook legislative process. In the context of the
ACA, however, some of those traditional assumptions are not only totally
irrelevant, but arguably are malpractice.
Let me give you a simple example. In Sebelius, some of the early
briefing had made a very big deal about the fact that the House version of
the bill contained a so-called “severability clause”—a provision stating that
if any part of the statute is ruled unconstitutional (as the Medicaid
expansion ultimately was), Congress still intends the rest of the statute to
stand.20 Severability clauses are common but, based on the principle of
legislative deference, the Court also has long applied its own default
presumption that statutes are presumed severable even without such a
clause unless they say otherwise.21 Because of that strong presumption,
Congress often does not include explicit severability clauses, and the Senate
version of the ACA did not contain one.
Back to Sebelius. There, the challengers argued that because the House
version of the bill had a severability clause, the fact that the final bill did
not have one meant something—i.e., the “dropping” of the clause was
intentional and so if the Medicaid portion went down in Supreme Court, the
entire statute should be struck down too.22
16. H.R. 4872, 111th Cong. (2010) (enacted).
17. 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
18. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
19. King v. Burwell, 759 F.3d 358 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 475 (2014).
20. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., STATUTES, REGULATION AND INTERPRETATION (2014).
21. See id.
22. Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256,
1301 (N.D. Fla. 2011) (“The lack of a severability clause in this case is significant because one
had been included in an earlier version of the Act, but it was removed in the bill that subsequently
became law.”), order clarified, 780 F. Supp. 2d 1307 (N.D. Fla. 2011), aff'd in part, rev'd in part
sub nom. Florida ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235 (11th
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I hope even after this mini tutorial you can see what an irresponsible
argument this was in light of the ACA’s legislative context. The House bill
means nothing here. Why? Because there was never a two-chamber
integration of bills. The only bill that matters is the Senate bill because,
unlike in the case of most legislation, the Senate never even had to
negotiate with the House version because of Senator Kennedy and the
freezing in time of the Senate text as the text when he died.
This is just one example of the new kind of analysis that health
lawyers and policymakers will need to do if they are going to be effective
players in this new era of federal statutory health law. King v. Burwell
raises similarly important issues about understanding how the two drafts
produced in the Senate merged into one, and what is relevant from that
process.23
Another reason it is important to understand health law as a federal
statutory field is because this reconceptualization of the field has
implications for policy reform. Today, health policy development must be
grounded in the context of Congress’s own internal structures and
understood in the context of Congress’s general lawmaking pathologies.24
Statutory law experts are quite familiar with the institutionalized inertia of
the legislative process and its tendencies toward incrementalism and path
dependence, something that political scientists also have noted for years.25
As a result, it is very unusual to expect big sweeping changes in a field that
is dominated by an already-existing landscape of federal statutes. The ACA
exemplifies this. Congress did not wipe the slate clean. Instead, Congress
took the preexisting landscape of health law and built upon it. The reason
this is significant is that the pre-existing landscape itself consisted of many
different programs, built upon one another and also structured in many
different ways. The ACA similarly builds upon Medicare—the national
insurance program for the elderly, run by the federal government;
Medicaid—the state-federal insurance program for low-income individuals
that is run jointly by the states and the federal government; and also the
private-employer insurance system. The ACA does improve on these
preexisting structures but it keeps them all.26 The result is not the kind of
Cir. 2011), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct.
2566 (2012).
23. See 759 F.3d 358, 371 n.2 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 475 (2014).
24. See Abbe R. Gluck, Federalism from Federal Statutes: Health Reform, Medicaid, and the
Old-Fashioned Federalists’ Gamble, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1749, 1751 (2013) (noting that in
designing health reform, Congress was typically path-dependent).
25. See Charles E. Lindblom, The Science of “Muddling Through”, 19 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 79,
84 (1959) (noting how Western democracies do not change through large “leaps and bounds”).
26. Id.
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statute that any reformer would have drafted from scratch; and it further
entrenches health law’s structural fragmentation. But it is also not a
surprise. Even as health policy wonks complained that the ACA had failed
insofar as it did not ameliorate health law’s fragmentation, experts on
Congress found the statute’s ultimate structure entirely predictable, even if
not ideal.
III. AGENCIES
I have provided just a small taste of the ACA’s legislative context. It is
equally important, however, to understand the administrative context of any
public-law regime that, like the ACA, leaves so much to implementation.
The amount of space I shall devote to the agency context here is directly
inverse to its importance. It is simply too complicated to capture in a brief
discussion.
What I do want to point out, however, is that the complexity of the
subject matter, the need for compromise, and the desire to allow variation in
ACA implementation across the states led to an enormous amount of
delegation in the ACA.27 The statute has several hundred delegating
provisions—an amount that some have surmised is unprecedented.28
Further, these delegations themselves are highly complex and often involve
multiple agencies, which are given overlapping jurisdiction. Take, for
example, the new Accountable Care Organizations (“ACOs”)—the
integrated health care concept that is one of the ACA’s flagship
innovations.29 At least four different agencies (the Treasury, Health and
Human Services, the Federal Trade Commission, and the Department of
Justice) have some authority over ACO formation.30 The result has been
that the different administrators have had an extremely difficult time with
coordination efforts because of different goals and different turf interests,
and because of the fact that the administrators are overseen by different

27. See CURTIS W. COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41180, REGULATIONS PURSUANT
PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT (P.L. 111-148) 2, 8 (2010)
(documenting the array of agencies involved in the Affordable Care Act rulemaking process and
mechanisms for collaboration).
28. Id.
29. See Jessica L. Mantel, Accountable Care Organizations: Can We Have our Cake and Eat
it Too?, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 1393, 1393 (2012) (highlighting the significance of accountable
care organizations in the framework of the Affordable Care Act).
30. See Susan S. DeSanti, ACO Antitrust Guidelines: Coordination Among Federal Agencies,
ANTITRUST
SOURCE,
Dec.
2011,
at
1,
2,
available
at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/antitrust_source/dec11_full_source.authc
heckdam.pdf (describing inter-agency coordination of ACO guidelines).
TO THE
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congressional committees. As a result, the implementation process has not
always produced the ideal level of clear guidance to the public.31
It is also worth noting that the ACA’s administrative process, much
like its legislative process, has had unorthodox features.32 The agencies
have had to do an enormous amount of work under intense time constraints,
public scrutiny and political division.33 The consequence has been that
agencies have used many unconventional regulating measures, such as
proceeding through guidance rather than through notice-and-comment
rulemaking,34 that differ importantly from the “textbook” administrative
law process one learns about in law school.35 This is not a development
unique to the ACA—it is a much broader trend, as I have illustrated
elsewhere36—but it is still a central feature of the ACA’s story.
There are other unique aspects of ACA implementation that have
received less attention. One of the most important, in my view, is the way
that Congress changed and improved the process for obtaining Medicaid
demonstration waivers under the Act.37 The waiver process has become a
subject of particular interest in recent years among lawyers and legal
scholars who are focused on state-federal relationships in the context of
major federal statutes.38 In general, this process of state-federal negotiation
and receive waivers from federal administrators has been described as a
“black box,” bereft of a formal framework that ensures notice and fairness
to both states and the public. The ACA contains an important innovation in
this area. As Sidney Watson has written, the ACA brings Medicaid
demonstration waivers “into the light,” with new requirements, including

31. See Thomas L. Greaney, Regulators as Market-Makers: Accountable Care Organizations
and Competition Policy, 46 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 35 (2014) (citing conflicts between health-care
regulators and antitrust agencies that encumber ACO administration).
32. See Nicholas Bagley & Helen Levy, Essential Health Benefits and the Affordable Care
Act: Law and Process, 39 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 441, 442 (2014) (describing these
unconventional methods).
33. Id..
34. Id.
35. Gluck et al., supra note 5.
36. Id.
37. See Five Key Questions and Answers About Section 1115 Medicaid Demonstration
Waivers,
HENRY
J.
KAISER
FAMILY
FOUND.
1,
2
(June
2011),
https://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/8196.pdf (citing changes to obtaining
demonstration waivers in the Affordable Care Act).
38. For a few of many recent examples, see Samuel Bagenstos, Federalism by Waiver After
the Health Care Case, in THE HEALTH CARE CASE 227 (Nathaniel Persily et al. eds., 2013);
David J. Barron & Todd D. Rakoff, In Defense of Big Waiver, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 265 (2013);
Theodore Ruger, Health Policy Devolution and the Institutional Hydraulics of the Affordable
Care Act, in THE HEALTH CARE CASE: THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS
359 (Nathaniel Persily et al. eds., 2013).
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public notice and comment at both the state and federal levels.39 This is an
important example of how health law is at the cutting edge of many public
law issues, even if many people do not yet realize it.
Finally, there is a whole separate story to tell, which I detail in other
work, about the extreme variety within health law itself when it comes to
the role of federal agencies.40 Some areas of health law are agency driven;
others are much less so and, interestingly, this variety exists even across the
different areas of health law that are all now included in within the same
overarching statute of the ACA. For example, if one looks at federal court
cases, one sees relatively few cases involving the Department of Labor’s
oversight of ERISA, but yet one will find many cases involving Health and
Human Service’s (“HHS”) (specifically, the Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services’ (“CMS”)) oversight of Medicare.41 Part of constructing
the health law as a public law story is going to require understanding those
differences.
IV. THE STATES
Federal agencies are not the only major implementers of health
statutory law; states also play a central role.42 So, increasingly, do private
actors, but I will not dwell on private actors here. Instead, I will briefly
discuss what I and my coauthors in other work call the “New Health Care
Federalism.”43
One of the most prominent books on health care federalism was
written right after President Clinton’s health reform effort failed in 1993.44
The book predicted that health law would “move . . . toward a reduced
federal role and an increased state role in setting policy, as well as in
administering and financing it.” 45 That is not what happened, but the
opposite has not happened either. After 1993, we had HIPPA, the HITECH

39. Sidney D. Watson, Out of the Black Box and Into the Light: Using Section 1115 Medicaid
Waivers to Implement the Affordable Care Act’s Medicaid Expansion, 15 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y
L. & ETHICS 213 (2015).
40. Gluck, supra note 4.
41. Id.
42. See generally Gluck, supra note 11.
43. See Baker et al., The New Health Care Federalism: An Empirical and Theoretical
Assessment of How Federalism Has Changed in Health Care and Beyond 3 (U. of Pa. Law
School, Public Law Research Paper No. 14-34; Yale Law School, Public Law Research Paper No.
525, 2015), (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the author).
44. HEALTH POLICY, FEDERALISM, AND THE AMERICAN STATES (Robert F. Rich & William
D. White eds., 1996).
45. Id. at 294 (emphases added).
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Act, the new Medicare (parts C and D), and now the ACA. This steady
stream of statutes effectuated a massive federalization of the field and could
have displaced the states. But it didn’t. Instead—and quite interestingly—
Congress chose in these same statutes to retain and enlarge the state role in
significant ways.46
There is a whole industry of law professors currently fighting over
whether the kind of state-federal relationships that statutes like the ACA set
up actually advance “federalism”—our bedrock constitutional principle of a
duel government, in which both the states and the federal governments have
meaningful roles to play.47 I take on that question elsewhere,48 but for
present purposes, I will note that I do think the ACA advances federalism. I
reach this conclusion because, today, one has to understand federalism in
light of the massive expansion of federal legislative power that has occurred
since the New Deal.49 Congress can now regulate almost anywhere it
wishes, provided it designs its statutes correctly. States have little to gain
anymore from insisting on total separation from federal law because if they
do so insist, they will likely lose their chance to shape major questions of
policy that have a direct effect on their citizens.50
When it comes to the ACA, for example, the big mistake is to think
that the alternative to Congress’s intervention was state intervention—it
wasn’t. The alternative was just more federal government. The big
federalism choice in the ACA was what divided the House and Senate—
whether the federal government should regulate with the states, or acting
alone. The states would have been rendered irrelevant to large swaths of
health law had they been left out of the ACA altogether and now, because
they were not left out, are instead central players in ACA policy. I call this
“federalism from federal statutes,” to signify how state power today inures
from within federal statutory schemes. And this is one fundamental way in
which the concept of federalism in health care has changed dramatically in
the modern era.51 To be sure, the idea that federalism is generated by
46. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1178 (2006) (allowing exceptions to the requirements under HIPAA
as long as the state meets certain additional requirements under the section); 42 U.S.C. § 1321
(2010) (granting states “flexibility in operation and enforcement of Exchanges”).
47. Feature, Federalism as the New Nationalism, 123 YALE L.J. 1889 (2014).
48. Abbe Gluck, Our [National] Federalism, 123 YALE L.J. 1996 (2014).
49. Id.
50. Id.; Heather K. Gerken, The Federalis(m) Society, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 941,
942–43 (2013) (“If the federal government wants to invade a regulatory sphere, it will find a way
to do it.”); Abbe Gluck, Federalism From Federal Statutes: Health Reform, Medicaid, and the
Old-Fashioned Federalists’ Gamble, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1749, 1755–56 (2013) (arguing that if
states resist Congress’s attempts to include them in federal policies, Congress will simply
“legislate without states partners,” which will increase federal power).
51. Gluck, supra note 48.
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Congress is counterintuitive at first and it is very different from traditional
constitutional theories of federalism. This federalism is an option—not an
entitlement—and it varies across statutory schemes.52 But that does not
mean that there is not power in it for the states.53
Let me illustrate this point with a few examples from the current
landscape of ACA implementation. Most people are familiar with the
basics. There are two large pieces of the ACA that rely on state
implementation: (1) the Medicaid expansion, and (2) the insurance
exchanges.
In the context of Medicaid, we have seen the states exert a lot of
leverage and experimentation from the inside of this federal scheme—not
by staying outside of it. We have seen the states negotiating with HHS to
run Medicaid in unusual ways for instance, by essentially privatizing it, as
Arkansas’s experience exemplifies.54 Those states never could have
reconfigured Medicaid in this way had they just washed their hands of the
whole thing.
The insurance exchange federalism story has even more layers. Even
as Senators and state advocates lobbied successfully in Congress to ensure
that states would be given the right of first refusal to run the exchanges,
politics have overcome initial policy preferences. In what has been mostly
an act of political resistance to the ACA as a whole, thirty-four states have
now refused to run their own exchanges. 55 The ACA requires the federal
government to run the exchanges for states that decline to do so.56 The big
irony is evident. The states most opposed to the federalization of health care
in the first place are the very same states that now have invited the federal
government to take over their insurance markets.
Perhaps even more interesting from a federalism perspective is how
the exchange story has confounded the traditional federalism
categorizations. The ACA has either changed our understanding of
federalism or is the most visible evidence yet of changes that were already
underway. As most lawyers are well aware, federalism has several defining

52. Id.
53. Id.; see also Gerken, supra note 50, at 943 (stating that the interplay between the federal
government and states under the Affordable Care Act offers states “meaningful opportunities for
states to exercise power”).
54. Medicaid Expansion in Arkansas, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (Feb. 12, 2015),
http://kff.org/medicaid/fact-sheet/medicaid-expansion-in-arkansas/.
55. See Sarah Kliff, It's Official: The Feds Will Run Most Obamacare Exchanges, WASH.
POST (February 18, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/02/18/itsofficial-the-feds-will-run-most-obamacare-exchanges/,
56. See 42 U.S.C. § 18041(c)(1) (2010) (providing that if a state does not establish an
exchange, the secretary and federal government shall establish an exchange within that state).
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features. One of the most famous is the idea that we look to the states and
not the federal government when we desire experimentation or local
variation. This is the “states as laboratories” argument, most famously
articulated by Justice Brandeis in 1932.57 The new health care federalism
inverts this assumption in important ways that have purchase for modern
federalism in general.
As it turns out, the whole “states as laboratories” idea was not
working—not only in health care, but in many other fields as well.58 States
often do not experiment at the level thought ideal for policy development.
Experimentation is expensive and risky; states may lose business to
neighboring states if they get too creative or protective on their own.
Indeed, it may not be common knowledge that some of the most important
state-led policy experiments of the modern age have come not through
states acting alone, but rather through states acting through federally-funded
regulatory schemes. In the environmental context, for instance, satisfactory
levels of state innovation in the area of air-pollution control did not occur
organically until Congress passed the major environmental statutes of the
1970s that effectively required the states to take the lead or have their airquality laws preempted by federal statute. In the Medicaid context, it was
states that first took advantage of that program’s flexibility to innovate and
expand the benefits-eligible population beyond the federal statute’s initial
target of children and their mothers. These state experiments, supported and
incentivized by the federal government, formed the basis of Medicaid’s
subsequent national expansions to cover those same populations. So, too,
the philosophy behind the ACA’s own Medicaid expansion—eligibility
based on an income threshold rather than demographic categories—was
first pioneered as a Medicaid state option by a few aggressive states. The
Massachusetts health reform law—the law on which much of the ACA was
based—was not an independent state experiment but rather was done
through Medicaid, specifically through a Medicaid waiver granted by the
Bush Administration.59 All of these are examples of experimentalism that
57. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“It is
one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the
rest of the country.”).
58. Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taking and Reelection: Does Federalism Promote
Innovation?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 593, 610–11 (1980); Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley,
Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903, 924–26 (1994); Gluck,
supra note 4, at 1764. See generally David A. Super, Laboratories of Destitution: Democratic
Experimentalism and the Failure of Antipoverty Law, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 541 (2008).
59. See generally An Act Providing Access to Affordable, Quality, Accountable Health Care,
2006
Mass.
Acts
ch.
58,
available
at
https://malegislature.gov/Laws/SessionLaws/Acts/2006/Chapter58 (explaining the various
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derives from national statutory law—from Congress getting in the game
and not stepping aside, which is an inversion of the typical federalism
account.
Another inversion is also worth emphasizing. In the traditional
account, “nationalism” is associated with policy uniformity, and
“federalism” with policy variation across the states. Statutes like the ACA
turn those assumptions upside down by not only tolerating, but also
incentivizing a wide variety of policy implementation across the states
within a single federal law. Congress expected Utah’s exchange to look
very different from Massachusetts’s, and it designed the ACA to allow for
that difference.60 The result is the kind of local policy tailoring that we
traditionally associate with leaving states to their own devices, but which
we actually get here by nationalizing health law.
Another common feature of federalism theory that the ACA calls into
question goes to the way we tend to talk about state participation in federal
law. Federalism theorists often measure federalism’s “success” in terms of
state cooperation. Scholars identify and puzzle over “cooperative
federalism,” “uncooperative federalism,” and countless variations on that
concept. But the ACA has made it difficult to measure federalism’s success
using this metric because statutes like the ACA dramatically complicate
what it means to cooperate in this context.
Some states, like New York, are clearly cooperating even though they
have not let the federal government in. These states have gone and
implemented the exchanges on their own, and all is well. But consider
Oregon. Oregon is a “blue” state that tried to be “cooperative” by
implementing its own exchange, but it failed, and the federal government
has had to step in.61 Now that the federal government is in Oregon, as a
formal legal matter, Oregon’s exchange looks no different than Texas’s.

features and mechanisms put in place through the Massachusetts Health Law); Ryan Lizza,
Romney’s
Dilemma,
NEW
YORKER
(June
6,
2011),
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2011/06/06/romneys-dilemma (discussing how Governor
Romney appealed for a waiver from the Bush Administration to expand state Medicaid benefits).
60. Cf. June M. Sullivan, Health Insurance Exchanges: Contrasts Between Utah and
Massachusetts,
ABA.HEALTH
ESOURCE
(May
2012),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/newsletter/publications/aba_health_esource_home/aba_healt
h_law_esource_0512_sullivan.html (discussing the differences in the health information
exchanges between Utah and Massachusetts, as these two exchanges were formed before the
ACA).
61. See Maria L. La Ganga, Oregon Dumps Its Broken Healthcare Exchange for Federal
Website,
L.A.
TIMES
(Apr.
25,
2014,
12:39
PM),
http://www.latimes.com/nation/politics/politicsnow/la-pn-oregon-drops-broken-healthcareexchange-20140425-story.html (discussing that despite Oregon’s early enthusiasm, officials had
to drop its own exchange and use the federal website instead).
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After all, the federal government is running the Texas exchange, too.
Texas’s decision not to cooperate, however, was an act of political
defiance—not the result of a good-faith effort that fell short due to
technological limitations.62 Are Oregon and Texas really to be viewed in
the same way from a federalism perspective just because they both have a
federally operated exchange? What if the federally operated exchange in
both states looked exactly the same?
The point is that it now becomes very hard to determine what
constitutes “a “success” for federalism, or, more existentially, to determine
what federalism is for. Sometimes when it comes to the ACA, it seems like
federalism is just a matter of attitude, and that can’t be right.
A third defining feature of federalism is state sovereignty and
autonomy, and the loss of that state power is always a looming fear in
cooperative federalism schemes because states are implementing federal
law instead of their own. To this fear, I want to offer two responses.
First, consider which states have had more “autonomy”; those that
worked with the federal government to design their own exchanges or to
come up with their own versions of Medicaid, or those that just refused to
play and/or let the federal government take over?
Second, ask yourself what would happen to state law if some
advocates had gotten their wish during the drafting of the ACA—i.e., if
Congress had left the states out of the ACA altogether. In that case, the
ACA would be completely federal, like a “Medicare for all” (which some
had advocated). As for the states? State legislatures, courts, and
administrators would now be largely irrelevant to health law and policy.
But, because Congress chose the opposite path, there has instead been an
enormous number of new state laws, state regulations, newly appointed
state officials, and state court cases trigged by the ACA because the ACA
sets in motion a new scheme that requires a lot of state lawmaking as part of
its implementation.63 In other words, the ACA depends on the states’ legal
apparatus, and so gives continuing relevance to that apparatus—to the state
legislatures, courts, administrators, and so on, that a different statutorydesign choice could have rendered irrelevant in the health care context.64

62. See Letter from Rick Perry, Governor of Tex., to Kathleen Sebelius, Sec’y of Health &
Human Serv. (July 9, 2012) (on file with Citizens’ Council for Health Freedom), available at
http://www.cchfreedom.org/pdf/HHS_Secretary_Sebelius-Rick_Perry.pdf (calling the ACA a
“power grab” and emphasizing that its “unsound encroachments” into Texas’ sovereignty would
not occur).
63. Baker et al., supra note 43; Gluck, supra note 48.
64. See KATIE KEITH & KEVIN W. LUCIA, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, IMPLEMENTING THE
AFFORDABLE CARE ACT: THE STATE OF THE STATES (Jan. 2014), available at
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The final point I want to make here is about the state-federal
negotiations that have occurred. The ACA story substantiates a view that is
emerging in the broader federalism literature, which is that this world of
administrative negotiation is really where the action is located when it
comes to federalism in general. One major concern has been that these
negotiations in general have been largely lawless. Even the statutory waiver
process, for instance, which is a central site of these interactions, has lacked
legal rules to guide state-federal interactions and ensure fairness. This will
be a very significant area for future law development, and as noted, the
ACA’s Medicaid provisions have a groundbreaking process innovation in
this regard that people in other fields soon will notice.65
Secondly, on this point, some have taken the view that the federal
government is being too “wimpy,” and the President has ceded too much
ground to the states in these federalism negotiations. But I think real issue is
that the interests and time horizons of the federal government are just very
different from those of the states; this is an important difference that
modern federalism theorists should recognize more than they currently
do.66
The whole philosophy of the ACA on the federal side is just to get this
thing in the door and improve it down the line. It is a very pragmatic
politics.67 The President’s interest—unlike that of many state officials—is
long term. He wants to get the statute entrenched. HHS, therefore, is likely
willing to do whatever it can within the limits of the law to let even resistant
states adopt the ACA in some way, whether it is by restricting Medicaid, or
doing something creative with the exchanges. To be clear, HHS is given
very broad discretion within the statute, and is permitted by the statute to
make the kinds of concessions that some wish it had not made. But each
additional state action to implement the ACA, it is critical to remember,
enmeshes the statute further in a state’s legal, bureaucratic, and political
web.
In other words, it is not that the federal government is desperate;
rather, it is acting with a long term strategy of federal statutory
entrenchment—a common story in the statutory-law literature that health

http://www.commonwealthfund.org/~/media/files/publications/fundreport/2014/jan/1727_keith_implementing_aca_state_of_states.pdf.
65. Watson, supra note 39.
66. Baker et al., supra note 43.
67. See Ruger, supra note 38 (discussing how the Obama administration’s goal of entrenching
the ACA for the long term lends itself to flexibility in negotiations with states on mechanisms for
implementation).
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lawyers need to understand.68 This is how to ensure that even if a
Republican gets elected President, the statute is more likely to be tweaked
than repealed.
V.

COURTS

This brings me to my last topic—the ACA and the courts. This statute
has been subject to court battle since literally the day it was signed.69 It now
has survived the 2012 constitutional challenge and the Hobby Lobby
contraceptive-mandate dispute essentially intact, as well as other less
significant court challenges.70
Now we have the new challenge: King v. Burwell, pending at the time
this lecture went to press.71 King brings together all of the themes of this
lecture. It is about the legislative context of the ACA, its statutory
interpretation, its agency implementation, and its federalism story. It is also
inevitably a story about the unique politics of health reform—and one hopes
it is not going to be a story about the next Bush v. Gore.72
In November of 2014, the Supreme Court took the rare action of
granting review in the case before the lower courts had finished deciding
it.73 There were four cases going through the federal circuits dealing with
the same issue, but only one had been finally decided before the Court
granted review.74 The D.C. Circuit (widely viewed as the second most
powerful court in the nation) had scheduled a full court review of its

68. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES (2010)
(detailing this process of administrative and statutory entrenchment).
69. See Nicole Huberfeld, Federal-State Tensions in Fulfilling the ACA’s Promises, NAT’L
CONST. CTR. (Oct. 7, 2013), http://blog.constitutioncenter.org/2013/10/federal-state-tensions-infulfilling-the-acas-promises/ (stating that the day the law was signed, states challenged the
mandated Medicaid expansion).
70. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby
Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
71. 759 F.3d 358 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 475 (2014).
72. At the time I delivered the Stuart Rome lecture, I had not yet written an amicus brief in
King and had not planned to do so. However, I did in fact write a brief shortly before these
remarks went to press. These remarks should be taken as entirely separate from the brief and were
finalized long before it was written.
73. King, 759 F.3d 358; Halbig v. Burwell, 758 F.3d 390 (D.C. Cir. 2014), reh'g en banc
granted and judgment vacated per curiam, No. 14-5018, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 17099 (D.C. Cir.
Sept. 4, 2014).
74. Halbig, 758 F.3d 390; King, 759 F.3d 358; Indiana v. IRS., 38 F. Supp. 3d 1003 (S.D.
Ind. 2014); Oklahoma ex rel. Pruitt v. Burwell, No. CIV-11-30-RAW, 2014 U.S. Dist. Lexis
139501 (E.D. Okla. Sept. 30, 2014), appeal held in abeyance, No. 14-7080, 2014 U.S. App.
LEXIS 24498 (10th Cir. Nov. 19, 2014), cert denied, No. 14-586, 2015 U.S. LEXIS 773 (Jan. 26,
2015).
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respective case for December 17, 2014.75 Rather than wait for that
decision—as is the Supreme Court’s usual practice—the Court plucked the
Fourth Circuit’s completed case for early review.76 This aggressive grant of
certiorari raised concerns about the politicization of the case.
On the topic of politics, and to really understand what the case is
about, we need to go back to 2010, when conservative scholar Michael S.
Greve made the following speech about the ACA:
This bastard has to be killed as a matter of political
hygiene. I do not care how this is done, whether it’s
dismembered, whether we drive a stake through its heart,
whether we tar and feather it and drive it out of town,
whether we strangle it. I don’t care who does it, whether
it’s some court some place, or the United States Congress.
Any which way, any dollar spent on that goal is worth
spending; any brief filed toward that end is worth
filing . . . .77
Mr. Greve went on to urge a litigating strategy what would
“concentrate on bits and pieces of this law.”78 King is the direct result of
that strategy. The case is brought by the same lawyers who brought the
2012 constitutional case and even one of the plaintiffs is the same.79 The
case seizes on four words of this 2,000 page statute to argue that the ACA’s
insurance-purchase subsidies are not allowed on those exchanges that are
operated by the federal government.80
This reading is devastating to the statute. Without the subsidies, the
exchanges will not function as they are supposed to in the three-dozen
states that have federally-operated exchanges. The ACA sets out an intricate
plan: it requires insurers to insure everyone, and to insure them at

75. No. 14-5018, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 17099 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 4, 2014).
76. King, 135 S. Ct. 475.
77. Michael S. Greve, Remarks at the American Enterprise Institute Conference: Who’s in
Charge? More Legal Challenges to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (Dec. 7, 2010),
available
at
https://www.aei.org/press/whos-in-charge-more-legal-challenges-to-the-patientprotection-and-affordable-care-act/.
78. Id.
79. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2575 (2012); King v. Burwell, 759
F.3d 358, 358 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 475 (2014).
80. See King, 759 F.3d. at 368 (summarizing plaintiffs’ argument and interpretation of
statutory language in § 36B of the ACA).
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essentially equal rates.81 The ACA then supports the insurance market,
which otherwise could not absorb these requirements, by requiring
everyone to get insured (the infamous “insurance mandate”), and it makes
that insurance requirement affordable with the subsidies.82 Without the
subsidies, insurance will be too expensive and thereby trigger certain
statutory exemptions from the mandate. As a result, many individuals will
be exempt from the requirement even as the insurers are still subject to their
own requirements.83 The consequence of all of this, as has been amply
demonstrated by others, is that the insurance markets will likely collapse.84
It should now be clear how King brings the story of this lecture
together. King is about the clarity with which the statute is drafted.
Remember that the ACA’s drafting history was highly unorthodox, and did
not have the last stage cleanup process that statutes usually have.85 King is
also about the agency’s role in interpreting the statute. Specifically, what is
being challenged in the case is a Treasury regulation that interprets the
language in question authorizing the subsidies.86 Finally, King is, of course,
about federalism. King has legs because of the unexpected federalism twists
in the ACA implementation, because many states unexpectedly decided not
to operate the exchanges themselves even after they had insisted on that
opportunity when the statute was being drafted.87
But King is also about a huge, established landscape of black-letter
federal statutory-interpretation law that existed before health reform that
now must decide health reform’s future. After all, as I have emphasized, the
81. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-1 (2012) (guaranteeing availability of coverage); 42 U.S.C. §
300gg-3 (2012) (prohibiting exclusion or discrimination based on preexisting conditions or health
status).
82. See 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (2012) (requiring individuals to maintain minimum essential
coverage for themselves and any dependents); 26 U.S.C. § 36B (2012) (allowing refundable tax
credit for coverage under a qualified health plan).
83. See Brief of America’s Health Insurance Plans as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Respondents at 9, King v. Burwell, No. 14-114 (Jan. 28, 2015) (explaining that when healthy
individuals opt out of health insurance coverage, this drives up the risk profile and premium costs
of insurance pools for all participants).
84. See id. at 10–12 (cautioning that “adverse selection” will destabilize insurance markets,
noting several failed state-level market reforms that were implemented without requiring
individuals to purchase insurance or pay a penalty, and without subsidizing premiums).
85. See supra Part II (reviewing the unique drafting history of the ACA).
86. See King v. Burwell, 759 F.3d 358, 365 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 475
(2014) (“[P]laintiffs contend that the statutory language calculating the amount of premium tax
credits according to the cost of the insurance policy that the taxpayer ‘enrolled in through an
Exchange established by the State under [§ 1311]’ precludes the IRS's interpretation that the
credits are also available on national Exchanges.” (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 36B(b)(2)(A),
(c)(2)(A)(i))).
87. See Brief for Professors Thomas W. Merrill et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents at 8–9, King v. Burwell, No. 14-114 (Jan. 28, 2015) [hereinafter Merrill Brief].
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ACA is federal statutory law and so health reform now lives and dies by the
legal doctrines that apply to statutes.
The scope of this lecture does not permit an exhaustive rehearsal of the
statutory doctrines relevant to King, and I have written too much about
them elsewhere to give justice here to the full range of argument. But let us
just consider a few, by way of illustration.88 One question in King is
whether the Court should focus on the literal meaning of the four contested
words in isolation or in the broader context of the statute. The Court’s
statutory doctrines answer this question, with countless cases in which
Court’s textualists, including Justice Scalia, have insisted that statutory
language must be read in context and in light of surrounding statutory
provisions. There are also settled doctrines to govern questions of statutory
ambiguity when an agency regulation is at issue. Consider the third most
cited Supreme Court case in history—the Chevron case—which holds that
when a statute is ambiguous, the Court must defer to implementing the
agency’s interpretation of that statute.89 Equally important is the long line
of doctrine that holds that federal statutes will not be interpreted to intrude
on the states without clear notice and crystal clear statutory language.90
Instead, the King challengers are making an argument that rewrites
history. Namely, they argue that Congress, at the time the ACA was
drafted, needed some kind of incentive to push the states to operate their
own exchanges, and so Congress wrote a statute that punishes the states if
they refuse—namely, by denying the subsidies whenever the federal
government has to operate an exchange. I have already described how the
ACA’s own legislative evolution and the statute’s federalism design tell
exactly the opposite story—that state-centered advocates insisted on giving
states the right of first refusal and so no “stick” was needed.

88. For more detail, see generally Abbe Gluck, Symposium: The Grant in King—Obamacare
Subsidies as Textualism’s Big Test, SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 7, 2014, 12:48 PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/11/symposium-the-grant-in-king-obamacare-subsidies-astextualisms-big-test/; Brief for William N. Eskridge, Jr. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents, King v. Burwell, No. 14-114 (Jan. 28, 2015).
89. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984).
90. Merrill Brief, supra note 87; Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460–61 (1991) (“[I]f
Congress intends to alter the ‘usual constitutional balance between the States and the Federal
Government,’ it must make its intention to do so ‘unmistakably clear in the language of the
statute.” (quoting Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985))); Pennhurst
State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 24 (1981) (“Congress must express clearly its intent
to impose conditions on the grant of federal funds so that the States can knowingly decide whether
or not to accept those funds.”).
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Additionally, the challengers’ narrative is deeply undermined by the
statutory text itself.91 As I have detailed in other venues, we need only look
as far as the Medicaid provisions of the ACA—which in no uncertain terms
withdraw federal funds for states that did not expand Medicaid as the ACA
envisioned—to see that Congress knew how to punish states for
nonparticipation when it wanted to, and that Congress knew how to make
those consequences clear.92 The complete absence of anything analogous
when it comes to the exchanges is the kind of damning textual evidence on
which the Court routinely relies and it makes the government’s point. This
point is further buttressed by the Court’s established legal doctrines on
federalism, which require “unmistakably clear” notice required to the states
of the consequences of their decision to be part of a federal statutory
scheme. There are other textual supports. For instance, the statute repeats
the phrase “state flexibility” more than five times in the context of
describing the states’ choice to operate an exchange and has a provision that
expressly sets forth the consequences of the states’ decision not to do so—a
provision that nowhere contains the penalty that challengers would find
buried, later in the law, in a section directed at how individuals should
calculate their tax credits.
I cannot do justice to this complex case here, so by way of conclusion
I will just walk through the primary textual debates in the case. The only
definition of the exchanges in the ACA is in Section 1563, which defines
“Exchange” as “an American Health Benefit Exchange established under
section [1311].”93 Section 1311 is the state exchange provision, and
provides that the “state shall establish an American Health Benefit
Exchange.”94 Section 1321 spells out the consequences of the state’s failure
to operate its own exchange.95 Notably, that section is entitled “state
flexibility”—not state punishment—and sits in a Part of the Act with the
same title.96 Section 1321 provides that if a state “will not have any
required Exchange operational”—note the “capital E” in “Exchange”—“. . .
the Secretary shall . . . establish and operate such [capital E] Exchange

91. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396(c) (2012) (explaining the consequences of a state’s noncompliance
with the Medicaid Provision of the statute).
92. Id.
93. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-91 (Supp. V 2012).
94. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 § 1311, 42 U.S.C. § 18031 (2012).
95. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 § 1321, 42 U.S.C. § 18041 (2012).
96. Id.
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within the state.” (emphasis added). 97 The natural reading of this language
is that the Secretary is establishing the state Exchange.98
Now, it is true that when you get to Section 1401, the statute says that
subsidies are calculated based on months enrolled in an “exchange
established by the state under 1311,” which is the state exchange
provision.99 In a vacuum, this looks like only the state exchanges get the
subsidies; but we know from the other sections of the ACA that the federal
exchange is, by definition, establishing such a state exchange because the
Act says that the only kind of exchange that exists is a state “Exchange.”
That’s confusing indeed, but this confusion clears up quickly when
you read the rest of the 2,000 page statute. Throughout the statute, there are
scores of other mentions of the (capital E) Exchange that apply clearly to
both state and federal exchanges. At least six of those mentions are in the
tax credit Section 1401 with no qualifying language, and which includes a
provision that specifically requires both federal and state exchanges to
report the subsidies that they have doled out to the IRS.100 These provisions
make no sense if the federal exchanges do not have subsidies.
The challengers in King have argued that they have the clear text on
their side, and that all the government has is an amorphous congressional
purpose. This is good strategic framing, but it is wrong. This is not a text vs.
purpose case.101 One does not need to go beyond the text of the ACA itself
to see the structure of the statute, and no one should because the ACA’s
legislative history, as I have detailed, is too convoluted.
The text of the statute alone makes clear that the whole thing depends
on the insurance subsidies. The text emphasizes “state flexibility”; contains
many provisions that assume the federal exchanges will be giving out the
tax credits and allows an easy comparison to the Medicaid provisions,
which do explicitly threaten the states with rescinding federal funds if the
states do not cooperate. At a minimum, these textual provisions make the
statute ambiguous—even though the government goes farther to argue that
the statutory text unequivocally supports its position.
In this regard, it is quite important to emphasize which side bears the
legal burden and which side is benefitted by any finding of ambiguity. All

97. Id. (emphasis added).
98. See King v. Burwell, 759 F.3d 358, 369 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 475
(2014) (explaining the defendant’s interpretation of the statute, who described “Exchange” as a
state Exchange set up by the Secretary).
99. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 § 1401, 26 U.S.C. § 36B (Supp. IV
2011).
100. 26 U.S.C. § 36B.
101. Gluck, supra note 88.
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of the relevant doctrines in this area favor the government if the statute is
not clear. The Chevron doctrine requires deference to the agency if the
statute is ambiguous. The federalism doctrines require “unmistakable
clarity” before a statute will be read to impose dramatically on the states, as
the challengers’ reading would. The Court also presumes that Congress
does not make huge changes (especially ones that penalize states) without
being clear, and also that Congress does not write statutes that are designed
to fail. To effectuate these presumptions, courts apply the so-called “major
questions rule,” which assumes—in Justice Scalia’s colorful phrasing of
words—that Congress does not “hide elephants in mouseholes”—that it
doesn’t sneak major things into statutes by burying them in indirect or
unclear language.102 One should also not forget the doctrines of
constitutional avoidance and severability, which direct courts—out of
deference to the legislature—to construe statutes so as not to be
dysfunctional.
In King, the challengers are arguing something totally implausible;
namely, that Congress sowed the seeds of the statute’s own destruction
intentionally into the act—that Congress set up its own federal exchanges to
fail—and that it did so intentionally and without explicit language. This is
an assumption that even the ACA dissenters in the 2012 case, Sebelius,
flatly rejected. There, the Joint Dissent assumed the availability of the
subsidies across all exchanges, and argued that the statute makes no sense
without the subsidies and cannot function without them.103 As the dissent
put it there:
Congress provided a backup scheme; if a State declines to
participate in the operation of an exchange, the Federal
Government will step in and operate an exchange in that
State.
...
That system of incentives collapses if the federal subsidies
are invalidated. Without the federal subsidies, individuals
would lose the main incentive to purchase insurance inside
the exchanges, and some insurers may be unwilling to offer
insurance inside of exchanges. With fewer buyers and even
fewer sellers, the exchanges would not operate as Congress
intended and may not operate at all.104

102. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001).
103. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2674 (2012) (joint dissent).
104. Id. at 2665, 2674 (emphasis added).
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VI. CONCLUSION
And so, here we are, in the middle of year five of the ACA’s life, and
with a statute that significantly transforms health law from a private law
regime to a field of public law. We have a Congress that has tried to repeal
the statute more than 40 times, we have state resistance, and we have
another Supreme Court case.
We also have a Supreme Court that, as I detail elsewhere, does not
have much health law experience, does not really understand the statutory
schemes, and certainly does not take a coherent approach to the issues in the
field.105 This is why it is time to start thinking deeply about what it means
to understand health law as federal statutory law, and to equip our healthlaw students with those doctrines. We need to start lawyering about health
law in the public-law context in which it now unquestionable resides. I hope
you will join me in doing so.

105. Gluck, supra note 4.

